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QFWFQ AS KAFKA?
POSSIBLE-WORLDS INTERPRETATIONS
If I am not mistaken, the heterogeneous
pieces I have enumerated resemble Kaa;
if I am not mistaken, not all of them re-
semble each other. is second fact is more
signiﬁcant. [. . .] e fact is that every writer
creates his own precursors.
(J L. B)
Model Reading: Kripke with Kaa
In  Italo Calvino published a collection of twelve stories which marked
the invention of a new genre: Le cosmicomiche. Before submitting the manu-
script to the publisher, he was still particularly concerned with one of the
earliest stories, ‘Un segno nello spazio’, and decided to read La crisi semantica
delle arti (), by the philosopher Emilio Garroni.
Calvino had received a copy of Garroni’s book when it was published, but
read it only in  because, as he wrote in a letter to the philosopher, in
 he began writing the cosmicomic stories and was determined to avoid
any concern with semantics. While putting the ﬁnal touches to the manu-
script, however, he realized that ‘Un segno’ represented a recursive model of
the cosmicomic universe and played a pivotal role within the collection. He
looked into La crisi semantica and found some helpful ideas to give unity to
his narrative project:
La lettura del Suo libro mi è venuta al momento giusto, dato che le cose che scrivo
adesso sono dei racconti in cui più che mai sono alle prese con ‘segnicità’ (quello
che per me è uno sviluppo d’una immagine di partenza secondo una logica interna
all’immagine o al sistema d’immagini) e ‘semanticità’ (quello che per me è la rag-
gera di possibili signiﬁcati d’ogni segno-immagine-parola, per lo più allegorizzazioni
storico-intellettuali, che si presentano sempre un momento dopo e di cui non devo
mai preoccuparmi troppo se voglio trovare l’organizzazione perfetta in cui la logica
I would like to thank Remo Ceserani and the anonymous reader for theModern Language Review for
their most valuable suggestions for improving this paper.
 Jorge L. Borges, ‘Kaa and his Precursors’, in Labyrinths: Selected Stories and Other Writings,
ed. by Donald A. Yates, trans. by James E. Irby (London: Penguin, ), p. .
 For a detailed account of the diﬀerent collections of cosmicomic stories see Italo Calvino,
Romanzi e racconti, ed. by Claudio Milanini and others,  vols (Milan: Mondadori, –), ,
–, – (henceforth abbreviated as RR; aer the ﬁrst full note, further references to
Calvino’s texts are given in parentheses in the text). See also Martin McLaughlin, ‘Introduction’,
in Italo Calvino, e Complete Cosmicomics, trans. by Martin McLaughlin and others (London:
Penguin, ), pp. vii–xxiv.
 Emilio Garroni, La crisi semantica delle arti (Rome: Oﬃcina Edizioni, ).
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segnica— che è una e una sola — e la logica semantica— che deve avere libero gioco
su vari piani — diventano una sola cosa).
So far, most readings of Calvino’s new genre and late works have consistently
focused on the semiotic logic of their composition: ‘As anyone familiar with
the ﬁctions of Calvino knows, Cosmicomics is inspired by the latest theories of
semiotics’, as Margarethe Hagen writes. Semantics, nevertheless, is not only
essential for interpretation but, as becomes clear in the letter to Garroni, also
for the narrative unity of the cosmicomic collection. In the following discus-
sion I shall argue that the integration of the two logical models is achieved
and can systematically be analysed through the deﬁnition of its main sign, the
‘unpronounceable’ Qfwfq, according to possible-worlds semantics.
Possible-worlds semantics, or model theory of modal logic as we know
it today, was developed at the beginning of the s with fundamental
contributions by Saul Kripke, whose inﬂuential paper ‘Semantical Considera-
tions on Modal Logic’ was published in . A technical analysis of Kripke’s
model clearly exceeds the purpose and competence of this paper, but possible-
worlds semantics can be used to develop and support a new interpretation of
Calvino’s cosmicomic project.
Kripke’s modal semantics produced a general redeﬁnition of formal logic
and, in the s, was tentatively used for a new theory of ﬁction. In a 
paper omas Pavel outlined its principles as follows:
A model structure in Kripke’s sense is an ordered triple (G, K, R), where K is a non-null
set, G is a member of K and R is a reﬂexive relation on K. In search of a more intuitive
representation of model structures, logicians use Leibniz’s notion of possible world. K
may be viewed as a set of possible worlds, G as a privileged member of this set, namely
the ‘real’ world, and R as a relation which links the actual world G with other worlds
belonging to K and which are possible alternatives to G.
e letter K, which designates a set of possible worlds, acknowledges Kripke’s
seminal work in modal semantics, that is to say in the branch of logic which
deals with the interpretation of possible, necessary, or contingent states of
aﬀairs. e name of a set is, of course, a logical symbol and not a proper name
 Italo Calvino, Lettere –, ed. by Luca Baranelli (Milan: Mondadori, ), pp. –
(henceforth abbreviated as L).
 Margarethe Hagen, ‘e Visual in Cosmicomics: Myth and Classical Rhetoric’, in Image, Eye
and Art in Calvino: Writing Visibility, ed. by Birgitte Grundtvig and others (London: Legenda,
), pp. – (p. ). Cf. Aldo Rossi, ‘La semiologia’, in Italo Calvino: atti del convegno inter-
nazionale (Firenze, Palazzo Medici-Riccardi – febbraio ), ed. by Giovanni Falschi (Milan:
Garzanti, ), pp. –; Guido Bonsaver, ‘Il Calvino semiotico: dal romanzo naturalistico
all’opera come macrotesto’, Italianist,  (), –.
 omas Pavel, ‘ “Possible Worlds” in Literary Semantics’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criti-
cism,  (), – (p. ); cf. Saul Kripke, ‘Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic’, in
Reference and Modality, ed. by Leonard Linsky (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ), pp. –
(p. ) (ﬁrst published in Acta philosophica Fennica,  (), –).
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like ‘Kripke’. e problem is that the same philosopher would question this
very intuitive distinction, while his solution to the problem provides a logical
argument to support our intuitive use of language as regards ﬁctional worlds.
To understand how this is possible, let us consider the letter K as a ﬁctional
name, as opposed to a symbol in a logical calculus. We could assume, for
instance, the strong interpretation given by George Steiner in Aer Babel
():
To a literate member of Western culture in the mid-twentieth century, the capital letter
K is nearly an ideogram, invoking the presence of Kaa or of his eponymous doubles.
‘I ﬁnd the letter K oﬀensive, almost nauseating,’ noted Kaa mordantly in his diary,
‘and yet I write it down, it must be characteristic of me.’ Such vividness and personal
focus of associative content can colour even the most abstract, formally neutral of
expressive terms. Contrary to what logicians have asserted, numerals do not necessarily
satisfy the condition of an identity and universality of associative content.
ere is no reason which prevents logicians from being members of this liter-
ate group, but none of them would ever assume Kripke or Kaa as a semantic
interpretation of K, let alone as its ‘associative content’. We could say that
readers of ﬁction and logicians belong to two diﬀerent reading groups, both
being members of the real world but with a diﬀerent relation to the possible
readings of K.
e main diﬀerence between logical and ﬁctional possible worlds, as ex-
plained by Umberto Eco in his paper ‘Small Worlds’ (), is that the ﬁrst
ones are ‘empty’ elements of a language calculus, while the second ones are
comfortably ‘furnished’ with cultural units—that is, they are constructs or
subsets of the same language that is used to describe them. e objection
could be raised, then, that possible-worlds semantics and ﬁction theory are
two diﬀerent models for two very diﬀerent sets of problems. On the whole,
the logical model can be transferred into the literary-theoretic domain only
by way of metaphorical implementation. As a matter of fact, however, Eco
further argues that they do have something fundamental in common: ‘From
its very beginning, the notion of possible world as dealt with by Model e-
ory is a metaphor coming from literature [. . .]. A possible world is what a
complete novel describes.’
Strictly speaking, unlike novels, possible worlds of logic cannot represent
incomplete states of aﬀairs and be semantically contradictory. And yet, ﬁc-
 George Steiner, Aer Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation (), rd edn (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, ), p. .
 Umberto Eco, ‘Small Worlds’, in id., e Limits of Interpretation (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, ), pp. – (p. ) (paper ﬁrst presented at the th Nobel Symposium,
Lidings, ).
 Ibid.
 Cf. Bohumil Fořt, ‘Are Fictional Worlds Really Possible? A Short Contribution to their
Semantics’, Style,  (), – (p. ).
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tion theory eﬀectively works with metaphors. e metaphor of a novel as a
complete description of a possible world states, at the same time, its logical
incompleteness and the ‘cosmological’ task of its model reader, who actualizes
some of the inﬁnite possibilities of this world.
If we deﬁne a model as a set-theoretic structure for the interpretation of a
language, then we can say that ‘the Model Reader is a textually established set
of felicity conditions (Austin, ) to be met in order to have a macrospeech
act (such as a text is) fully actualized’. When scientiﬁc descriptions of the
actual world are used as possible worlds of literature, metaphors constitute a
model of semantic interpretation. For example, Euclidean geometry describes
the actual world, even if in abstract terms, and ‘can become the portrait of a
possible world only if we take it as the portrait of Abbot’s Flatland’.
I think that this is what happens in Calvino’s Cosmicomiche, where scientiﬁc
theories are taken as starting-points for the stories told by a model reader of
this world, called Qfwfq. Accordingly, I shall read Calvino through Kripke,
and then focus on Kaa’s relevance for a broader interpretation of Qfwfq’s
possible worlds. It is an ‘interpretative bet’, as Eco would say, and involves
some degree of over-interpretation, but ‘the contexts allow us to make this bet
less uncertain than a bet on the red or the black of a roulette wheel’.
Qfwfq: Name and Necessity
Introducing the third collection of cosmicomic stories, entitled La memoria
del mondo (), Calvino described the main character as follows:
Protagonista delle ‘Cosmicomiche’ è sempre un personaggio, Qfwfq, diﬃcile da deﬁ-
nire, perché di lui non si sa nulla. Non è nemmeno detto che sia un uomo: probabil-
mente possiamo considerarlo tale dal momento in cui il genere umano comincia ad
esistere; [. . .] non è nemmeno un personaggio, Qfwfq, è una voce, un punto di vista,
un occhio (o un ammicco) umano proiettato sulla realtà d’un mondo che pare sempre
più refrattario alla parola e all’immagine. (RR, , –; cf. ibid., p. )
e description bears manifold contradictions, in particular the two state-
ments that the protagonist is always the same character but is not properly a
character. In fact, Qfwfq is the model reader of the cosmicomic universe, not
simply one of its members. is partially explains another salient contradic-
tion: on the one hand, we are told that the protagonist is ‘probably’ human as
far as there is human life in the world; on the other hand, there is a protagonist
 Umberto Eco, e Role of the Reader: Explorations in the Semiotics of Texts (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, ), p. . Eco’s reference is to John L. Austin, How to Do ings with
Words, ed. by James O. Urmson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ).
 Eco, ‘Small Worlds’, p. .
 Umberto Eco and others, Interpretation and Overinterpretation (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, ), p. .
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only as far as there is a story—that is, a narrative voice or a human point of
view projected onto a world which appears more and more ‘refractory’ to any
ﬁctional—verbal or visual—treatment.
In the second edition of La memoria del mondo, published in , Calvino
added a ‘Postilla’, in which he further clariﬁed that Qfwfq is simply the charac-
ter which says ‘I’, each time allowing the passage from the opening quotation
of a scientiﬁc theory to the story itself. But he also gave new elements for the
interpretation of the narrative voice:
Questa voce appartiene a un personaggio che risponde al nome impronunciabile di
Qfwfq (i nomi dei personaggi delle Cosmicomiche sono tutti più o meno impronuncia-
bili, sembrano più formule che nomi), un personaggio che si esprime e si comporta
come chiunque di noi, ma che è diﬃcile deﬁnire un essere umano dato che ‘era già
lì’ quando il genere umano non esisteva, e anche prima che ci fosse la terra e la
vita sulla terra; comunque, pare che egli abbia assunto successivamente varie forme,
anche animali (mollusco, o dinosauro) e in seguito umane, e si ritrova oggi a essere
un vecchietto che ne ha viste tante, e che per di più ha l’abitudine di sballarle grosse.
Le teorie sull’origine della Luna, per esempio, sono varie e in contraddizione tra loro;
a ciascuna di esse Qfwfq dà ragione e porta la sua testimonianza a favore. (RR, ,
–)
One of the main tasks of Qfwfq is thus supporting each one of the theories
about the universe, however contradictory they may appear, with a diﬀerent
story. Contradictions about its probable human status are well suited to the
possible ﬁctional worlds. Some of the contradictions can also appear as na-
tural as the fact that light particles travel through space as probability waves
without collapsing onto one single reality, a fact that supports (with the neces-
sary mathematical calculations) Hugh Everett’s ‘many-worlds interpretation’
of our actual world. To be sure, the process of storytelling appears like mea-
suring an atom according to quantum theory: as a result, it creates a universe
of inﬁnite parallel worlds.
But what about the alleged impossibility of pronouncing Qfwfq’s name?
e adoption of a character with an ‘unpronounceable’ name, in principle,
does not mean that we cannot imagine vocalized instances as (more or less
strong) interpretations of the cosmicomic project. is name is not like the
Hebrew Tetragrammaton with an additional letter for the sake of symmetry.
It is ‘more or less unpronounceable’, in the ﬁrst place, for speciﬁc narrative
reasons: like the protagonist of Samuel Beckett’s Unnamable (), its main
function is ‘say I. Unbelieving’—that is to say, interpreting the self-reference
of the ﬁrst-person pronoun as an utterly ﬁctional function.
 Samuel Beckett, e Unnamable (New York: Grove, ; repr. London: Calder & Boyars,
), p. .
 Cf. Kristi Siegel, ‘Italo Calvino’s Cosmicomics: Qfwf[q]’s Postmodern Autobiography’, Italica,
 (), – (pp. –).
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In an interview for the  Strega Prize, Calvino spelt the name as ‘qu-eﬀe-
vudoppio-eﬀe-qu’, and suggested that all cosmicomic characters should not
be read but rather seen, like some foreign names: ‘Spesso io credo che i perso-
naggi dei romanzi, soprattutto dei romanzi stranieri, li vediamo più di quanto
non li leggiamo, così, fonicamente, e quindi sono specie di formule che sono
molto riconoscibili.’ As it is for Steiner’s K, this group of letters is ‘nearly
an ideogram’, a strange name in a foreign language, which defamiliarizes the
reader from the ordinary name-functioning and focuses the attention on the
story. is raises the question of what makes the diﬀerence between a name,
which ultimately secures the possibility to ‘say I’ in all possible worlds, and
any other word or (more or less random) string of letters. Is Qfwfq a name at
all? If so, it is in the ﬁrst place the name of a K-set of possible worlds, each
one described by one of the cosmicomic stories.
‘Non sappiamo se Italo Calvino abbia mai posto l’occhio al telescopio per
scrutare stelle e pianeti’, as the writer ironically noted in the ‘Postilla’ (RR, ,
). In fact, it is not necessary to know whether he did it or not, as Kripke
suggested in his  lectures on ‘Naming and Necessity’:
A possible world isn’t a distant country that we are coming across, or viewing through
a telescope. Generally speaking, another possible world is too far away. Even if we
travel faster than light, we won’t get to it. A possible world is given by the descriptive
conditions we associate with it. [. . .] ‘Possible worlds’ are stipulated, not discovered by
powerful telescopes.
e same holds true for proper names, which are stipulated by an initial act
of linguistic ‘baptism’. Kripke therefore points out that there is no logical
reason to invalidate the intuitive supposition that a name is a constant of an
individual in all possible worlds. To express this ordinary-language evidence
with a more technical deﬁnition, the philosopher says that a name is a ‘rigid
designator’, i.e. a logical sign which refers to ‘the same thing’ in all possible
worlds.
Elaborating on the semantic treatment of modalities outlined by Rudolf
Carnap in Meaning and Necessity, Kripke clariﬁes that the meaning of a
name is not a description of immutable properties, which may change in dif-
ferent possible worlds, but the individual the subject term refers to. Such an
individual is the same in all possible worlds for the simple reason (in simple
terms, at least) that these worlds are diﬀerent descriptions of ‘the same thing’.
 Calvino [VHS], ed. by Daniela Brogi,  vols (Palermo: Palumbo, ),  (my transcription).
 Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity, nd edn (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
), p. .
 Ibid., p. .
 Rudolf Carnap, Meaning and Necessity: A Study in Semantics and Modal Logic (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, ; nd edn ; repr. ).
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‘Fictional worlds’, aer all, ‘are the only ones in which sometimes a theory of
rigid designation holds completely.’
For the purpose of my analysis, the main consequence of Kripke’s theory
of rigid designation is that the existence of a name is a suﬃcient condition
for a ‘trans-world identiﬁcation’, and this is the very ﬁrst function of Qfwfq.
It designates the same individual in diﬀerent worlds, because its diﬀerent
properties do not aﬀect the subject term; on the contrary, the criteria for the
identiﬁcation follow the stipulated identity of the subject term in all possible
worlds. Qfwfq is ‘segno e regno e nome’ of the Cosmicomiche (RR, , ).
Each cosmicomic story is a diﬀerent possible world, but in each one Qfwfq is
the same individual and we recognize it in all stories. Perhaps Calvino solicits
the reader’s involvement exactly in this basic question: what is identity if not
the individual way to tell one’s story?
As the author of the ﬁrst sign of the cosmicomic universe, we do identify
Qfwfq as the name of the voice which says I: ‘Era come un nome, il nome di
quel punto e anche il mio nome che io avevo segnato su quel punto’ (RR, ,
). We do recognize its distinctive voice even when it is reduced to ‘io
Q’ (RR, , ), as in the eponymous last story of Ti con zero ()—the
second cosmicomic collection, eventually included as the last cycle of Cosmi-
comiche vecchie e nuove (). In this case, Qfwfq is almost the name of the
universe at I, where narrative time is reduced to the simplest possibility of
identiﬁcation with the subject that says I (Q). Otherwise, it would become an
‘accidental’ designator of the ﬁctional universe of reference: ‘one meter long
at t’, argues Kripke, is not the same as ‘one meter’ in all possible worlds.
e ﬁrst-person pronoun is a very common instance of a name as a ri-
gid designator. is is the constant ‘name’ that we use throughout our lives
despite all the changes we undergo or the aliases we may assume. It gives
unity and continuity to the collection of stories which make an individual life,
from linguistic baptism to metaphysical storytelling. And this is why Kristi
Siegel could interpret Calvino’s Cosmicomiche as ‘Qfwfq’s Postmodern Auto-
biography’, where the postmodern element is given by ‘projecting possible
worlds’ beyond the classic one-world frame of reference.
With a further distinction, we shall say that the ﬁrst-person pronoun maps
the ‘intensional’ ﬁeld of a proper name to all possible worlds in which refer-
ring to the same individual as a Self makes sense in the same way—that is
to say, it posits a logical equivalence beyond the actual naming, as opposed
to the ‘extensional’ ﬁeld of individuals that have the same name, which can
 Eco, ‘Small Worlds’, p. .
 See above, n. .
 Kripke, Naming and Necessity, pp. –.
 Siegel, p. .
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be empirically determined. ere has been a discussion on whether or not
the intensional framework still functions in Kripke’s model. Lubomír Doležel
argues that the ‘radically non-essentialist semantics’ of proper names as rigid
designators does imply the necessity of an intensional name-functioning in
ﬁction, which does not require the descriptive completeness of logical sets:
Let us assume that the ﬁctional world is given by the set of its individuals, distinguished
from each other by purely extensional signs, such as lower-case letters of the alphabet.
In other words, the ﬁctional individuals of the set D=a, b, c, d, … are individuated,
but not yet named in natural language terms. In the act of naming, each ﬁctional
individual will be assigned either a proper name, or a deﬁnite description. If this
assignment is carried out consistently and exclusively in the text, we will say that a
two-value intensional functioning of naming operates in the text.
Such a functioning can be plainly observed in the Cosmicomiche, where sets
of letters are selected as proper names, such as Qfwfq, while some other
characters are designated by deﬁnite descriptions only, such as ‘mio cugino
il sordo’ in the ﬁrst story, ‘La distanza della luna’. But this is only a minimal
regularity in the many-value system of naming that a ﬁctional writer can
adopt, including some relevant exceptions to the rule.
One of the main regularities in the intensional name-functioning of Qfwfq’s
stories is symmetry. In the monograph I, Writer, I, Reader () Stephen
Chubb pointed out that ‘the apparently random typographical formation of
his name reﬂects the arbitrariness of naming signs, and its palindromic form
suggests the binary polarity that is a common feature of Calvino’s writing’.
In fact, Qfwfq is self-referential like any other name, being the sign of a
reﬂexive relation between reality and possible worlds: ‘every world’, Kripke
explains, ‘is possible relative to itself ’. But the palindromic set of letters
allows further speculations on the mirror function of the main character as a
double of the writer, whose existence is coextensive with his ﬁctional possible
worlds.
In a ﬁctional framework, reﬂexive symmetry may also exhibit a funda-
mental linguistic rule, which brings literature back to the epistemic function
and structure of language: each and every sign becomes meaningful in a sys-
tem of oppositions. At a higher level, the same happens in the formation of
mythologies. e oppositional narrative of the cosmicomic universe becomes
apparent when we consider the rival names Qfwfq and Kgwgk in ‘Un segno
nello spazio’, for instance, or Qfwfq and Pfwfp in ‘Giochi senza ﬁne’. ese
 Cf. Carnap, p. .
 Lubomír Doležel, ‘Proper Names, Deﬁnite Descriptions and the Intensional Structure of
Kaa’s e Trial’, Poetics,  (), – (pp. –).
 Stephen Chubb, I, Writer, I, Reader: e Concept of Self in the Fiction of Italo Calvino
(Leicester: Troubadour, ), p. .
 Kripke, ‘Semantical Considerations’, p. .
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symmetrical names clearly rule out the possibility of a random choice of
letters: once the sign ‘Qfwfq’ has been introduced in the ﬁctional universe,
other names follow in a systematic relationship.
e set of letters composing Qfwfq as the ‘ﬁrst sign’ is, of course, a much
more complicated choice, as Calvino ruminates in ‘Un segno’:
La forma da dare al segno, voi dite non è un problema perché, qualsiasi forma abbia,
un segno basta serva da segno, cioè sia diverso oppure uguale ad altri segni: anche qui
voi fate presto a parlare, ma io a quell’epoca non avevo esempi a cui rifarmi per dire lo
faccio uguale o lo faccio diverso, cose da copiare non ce n’erano, e neppure una linea,
retta o curva che fosse, si sapeva cos’era, o un punto, o una sporgenza o rientranza.
Avevo l’intenzione di fare un segno, questo sì, ossia avevo l’intenzione di considerare
segno una qualsiasi cosa che mi venisse fatto di fare, quindi avendo io, in quel punto
dello spazio e non in un altro, fatto qualcosa intendendo di fare un segno, risultò che
ci avevo fatto un segno davvero. (RR, , )
Typographical symmetry ﬁnally suggests two more speculative possibilities:
using a typewriter to select random letters, the Italian keyboard QZERTY—
as opposed to the standard American keyboard—would allow the typing of
‘Qfwfq’ by a symmetrical movement on the three alphabetical rows. In cursive
writing, on the other hand, letters are logically connected by some inten-
sional form of wording. Let us suppose that the intensional character is the
name ‘Kaa’: the story ‘Un segno’ would let us assume that this choice is not
unmotivated.
As Calvino acknowledged in his  letter to Garroni, the composition of
this story was particularly long and diﬃcult. ‘Un segno nello spazio’ was ﬁrst
published in the journal Il Caﬀè in , and a year later, with some changes,
in the volume of Le cosmicomiche. One of these changes is particularly mean-
ingful formy argument: in the ﬁrst version the name of the semiotic antagonist
of Qfwfq is not Kgwgk, but ‘Kfw’ (see RR, , ). Did Calvino change it
because of his semantic anxiety, to avoid summoning up the name of Kaa?
To be sure, ‘il nome fu dedotto in seguito, nella più tarda epoca dei nomi’ (RR,
, ). In the clustered index of possible precursors and inﬂuences, however,
the ﬁrst sign witnesses what will be expressed by Calvino ten years later, in
La taverna dei destini incrociati (), namely that ‘la parola scritta tiene
sempre presente la cancellatura della persona che ha scritto o di quella che
leggerà’ (RR, , ).
Worlds of Possibility, Levels of Reality
In the lower part of a manuscript page of Le cosmicomiche, Calvino noted that
Qfwfq is a character in so far as it is ‘una costante stilistica e di rapporto con
la realtà’. In terms of possible-worlds semantics, we could say that it is a
 Album Calvino, ed. by Luca Baranelli and Ernesto Ferrero (Milan: Mondadori, ), p. .
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constant—say, a rigid designator—which allows trans-world identiﬁcation. Its
reference to the real world is expressed through a ‘reﬂexive relation on K’,
which Calvino speciﬁcally sees as a stylistic (intensional) function: without the
identiﬁcation of Qfwfq’s ﬁrst sign, in fact, this relation is inscribed into reality
but diﬃcult to read, like the ‘gamba male inchiostrata della lettera R che in
una copia d’un giornale della sera s’incontrava con una scoria ﬁlamentosa
della carta’ (RR, , ).
We have to make a distinction between the reﬂexive relation and reality
itself, but on what basis? In his book Heterocosmica, Doležel explains that
possible-worlds semantics provides a consistent theoretic model of ﬁctiona-
lity, but must reject mimetic or naive realism:
Mimetic reading, practised by naïve readers and reinforced by journalistic critics, is
one of the most reductive operations of which the human mind is capable: the vast,
open, and inviting universe of ﬁctional discourse is shrunk to the model of one single
world, actual human experience. Even if its sole merit were to oﬀer an alternative to
the doctrine of mimesis, possible-worlds semantics of ﬁctionality deserves a hearing.
is does not mean that realism should be abandoned, quite the contrary. It
simply means that possible worlds may be logically treated as ‘real’. As Chris-
topher Norris puts it, modal realism is ‘a promising alternative to some of the
more extreme anti-realist or discourse-relativist positions that have occupied
the high ground of literary theory over the past two decades’.
One of the issues that Kripke’s model helped to overcome is precisely
the logical interpretation of sentences concerning non-existent entities, like
the round square or any ﬁctional character, which the philosopher later pre-
ferred to call ‘unactualized possible entities’, according to his famous example:
‘Holmes does not exist, but in other states of aﬀairs, he would have existed.’
Fictional existence proves the insuﬃciency of one-world realism.
We can quote in this connection the letter that Calvino sent to François
Wahl in , concerning the translation of his novel Il cavaliere inesistente
(): ‘Je ne dis jamais que le chevalier est irréel. Je dis qu’il n’existe pas. Ça
c’est très diﬀérent’ (L, p. ). Despite his empty armour, Calvino’s knight is
not what Bertrand Russell would call an ‘empty term’—like ‘the present king
of Italy’, who may be bald but does not exist, as Russell would say. Possible-
worlds semantics makes it possible to hold on to the meaning of non-existent
entities despite the apparent lack of reference in the actual world, because it
 See above, at n. .
 Lubomír Doležel, Heterocosmica: Fiction and Possible Worlds (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, ), p. x.
 Christopher Norris, Fiction, Philosophy and Literary eory: Will the Real Saul Kripke Please
Stand Up? (London: Continuum, ), p. .
 Kripke, ‘Semantical Considerations’, p. ; cf. ibid., p. .
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explains that a ﬁctional world does not pre-exist but is semantically construc-
ted by the text.
In the same year as Calvino’s Cavaliere inesistente, namely , Sergio
Solmi and Carlo Fruttero published a very successful collection of science
ﬁction stories which had a noteworthy title: Le meraviglie del possibile. In
his introduction Solmi emphasized that the possible worlds imagined by
American science ﬁction had a connection with the Spanish literature of the
conquista: ‘Allora era la scoperta e la conquista del Nuovo Mondo [. . .]; oggi è
la scoperta dei nuovi mondi che la scienza dell’atomo, l’astronautica, la nuova
biologia ci lasciano intravedere.’ A prominent example would be La galas-
sia ‘Quijote’, as Aldo Ruﬃnatto calls it, which connects historic reality and
the possible worlds of chivalric literature. And in fact, Solmi and Fruttero
wanted their book to inaugurate an ideal library ‘in attesa che la science ﬁction
crei ﬁnalmente il suo Chisciotte’.
Calvino shared this vision, and Qfwfq can certainly be seen as a kind of
cosmicomic Quijote, but not in the territory of science ﬁction. In the introduc-
tion to La memoria del mondo, the writer explained that the main diﬀerence
between the cosmicomic stories and science ﬁction is in the diﬀerent relation-
ship to reality, considering the scientiﬁc description of the actual world as the
starting-point from which to imagine other possible worlds:
Io vorrei servirmi del dato scientiﬁco come d’una carica propulsiva per uscire dalle
abitudini dell’immaginazione, e vivere magari il quotidiano nei termini più lontani
dalla nostra esperienza; la fantascienza invece mi pare che tenda ad avvicinare ciò
che è lontano, ciò che è diﬃcile da immaginare, che tenda a dargli una dimensione
realistica o comunque a farlo entrare in un orizzonte d’immaginazione che fa parte già
d’un’abitudine accettata. (RR, , )
In other words, science ﬁction tends to mimetic reduction. As shown by
Massimo Bucciantini, later developments in the genre conﬁrmed Calvino’s
opinion, ‘facendo passare in secondo piano la fantascienza come viaggio spa-
ziale e avventura cosmica e quindi rendendo sempre più esigui i suoi rapporti
con il romanzo cavalleresco’.A realistic description of possible worlds ought
not to overlook the fact that fantasy is a narrative ‘mode’ rather than a genre,
as pointed out by Remo Ceserani, and calls for a pertinent modal theory.
In the article ‘Deﬁnizione di territori: il fantastico’, written on the occasion
of the publication of Tzvetan Todorov’s Introduction à la littérature fantastique
 Le meraviglie del possibile: antologia della fantascienza, ed. by Sergio Solmi and Carlo Fruttero
(), nd edn (Turin: Einaudi, ), p. ix.
 Aldo Ruﬃnatto, La galassia ‘Quijote’: in margine ai mondi possibili dell’ingegnoso idalgo
(Turin: Giappichelli, ), pp. –.
 Solmi and Fruttero, p. xix.
 Massimo Bucciantini, Italo Calvino e la scienza: gli alfabeti del mondo (Rome: Donzelli, ),
p. , n. .
 Remo Ceserani, Il fantastico (Bologna: Il Mulino, ), p. .
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(), Calvino made the point that the Italian words ‘fantasia’ and ‘fanta-
stico’ do not imply the reader’s belief in the ﬁctional world, but ‘implicano al
contrario una presa di distanza, una levitazione, l’accettazione di una logica
che porta su altri oggetti e altri nessi da quelli dell’esperienza quotidiana’.
e only Italian example that Calvino provided of this fantastic logic was
Ariosto, but among its modern parallels we ﬁnd the name of Kaa. It is not
simply because Kaa foreshadows the speciﬁc ‘ossessione del trascendente’
which characterizes science ﬁction, as Solmi pointed out.
e connection between Kaa and Ariosto becomes clear in the ﬁrst of
Calvino’s Lezioni americane (), on the literary value of ‘lightness’, which
ends with Kaa’s short storyDer Kübelreiter ().e ‘Bucket Rider’ brings
back to life the knightly dimension of the Ariostesque world, and at the same
time represents the ‘levitazione’ of fantasy (S, p. ) which makes the reader
see the world beyond everyday reality, at a higher level of understanding of
the laws we live by.
More technically, according to Marie-Laure Ryan, Kaa’s ‘realistic fantasy’
is characterized by the break-up of physical and taxonomic compatibility
between the actual and the textual world, a suspension of natural laws which
creates an ‘undecidable’ reality:
e text may present what omas Pavel () calls a ‘dual’ or ‘layered’ ontology:
the domain of the actual is split into sharply distinct domains obeying diﬀerent laws,
such as the sacred and the profane in medieval mystery plays, or the visible world
(everyday life) versus the world of the invisible (the Court, the Castle) in Kaa’s novels
(Doležel ). Unlike the private worlds of the characters’ mental constructs, ‘the
Sacred’ or ‘the Invisible’ are not alternative possible worlds located at the periphery of
the textual system, but complementary territories within the central world. In Kaa’s
novels, TAW [=Textual Actual World] is split between a realistic sphere [. . .] and a
sphere of undecidable relation to AW [=Actual World].
We have already seen that the cosmicomic semantics, as opposed to the semi-
otic structure, involves ‘libero gioco su vari piani’. ese are levels of realistic
fantasy. In his paper on ‘I livelli della realtà in letteratura’ (), Calvino
concluded that ‘la letteratura non conosce la realtà ma solo livelli. Se esista la
realtà di cui i livelli non sono che aspetti parziali, o se esistano solo i livelli,
questo la letteratura non può deciderlo’ (S, p. ). As a matter of fact, this
theory of the ‘levels of reality’ can be recast by translating Kripke’s model
 Italo Calvino, Saggi –, ed. by Mario Barenghi (Milan: Mondadori, ), p. 
(henceforth abbreviated as S); Tzvetan Todorov, Introduction à la littérature fantastique (Paris:
Seuil, ).
 Solmi and Fruttero, p. xvi.
 Marie-Laure Ryan, Possible Worlds, Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Narrative eory (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, ), p. . Ryan’s references are to omas Pavel, Fictional Worlds
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, ), and Lubomír Doležel, ‘Intensional Function,
Invisible Worlds, and Franz Kaa’, Style,  (), –.
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theory of possible worlds into the speciﬁc language of the ﬁctional worlds of
literature.
If the experience of the ‘written universe’ is primarily centred in the one-
person world, all diﬀerent ontological layers unfold from the ‘one-layer
universe’ constituted by the ﬁctional subject, as Pavel observed. Doležel
considers it ‘the most felicitous and instructive starting point of ﬁctional se-
mantics’. In a similar way, Calvino frames the so-called Homeric question
within the intensional levels associated with a sentence such as ‘Io scrivo che
Ulisse ascolta il canto delle Sirene’, and remarks:
nulla cambierebbe se ‘io’ fossi io che vi parlo e anche l’Omero di cui scrivo fossi sempre
io, cioè se quello che attribuisco a Omero fosse una mia invenzione. Il procedimento
risulterebbe subito chiaro se la frase suonasse: ‘Io scrivo che Omero racconta che Ulisse
scopre che le Sirene sono mute’. In questo caso per ottenere un determinato eﬀetto
letterario io attribuisco aprocrifamente a Omero un mio capovolgimento o deforma-
zione o interpretazione del racconto omerico. (In realtà l’idea delle sirene silenziose è
di Kaa; facciamo conto che l’io soggetto della frase sia Kaa.) (S, p. )
e lexical proximity of the Italian verbs ‘contare’ and ‘raccontare’ is impor-
tant for the semantic calculus: ‘Noterete che non ho scritto “Omero scrive” né
“Omero canta” ma “Omero racconta”, per lasciarmi aperte entrambe le pos-
sibilità’ (S, pp. –), namely the two alternative worlds of the Odyssey and
of its legendary author, duplicated by Kaa’s rewriting of the myth. When
Calvino writes ‘facciamo conto’, the interpretative supposition that Kaa
may be the writing subject splits the ontological assumption of ‘I am’ into the
reﬂexive speech-act ‘I am writing’, which logically belongs to the same inten-
sional ﬁeld of the ﬁctional characters. Accordingly, in the Cosmicomiche we
can also assume a set of possible worlds in which the semantic interpretation
of Qfwfq is Kaa.
In the example, the embedded reference is to Kaa’s parable Das Schweigen
der Sirenen ()—parodied by Queneau in his Chant du styrène (),
which Calvino eventually translated in . Calvino uses Kaa’s parable to
point out a very important semantic principle: ‘stiamo attenti a non confon-
dere livelli di realtà (interni all’opera) con livelli di verità (in riferimento a un
“fuori”)’ (S, pp. –). e conﬂation of reality and truth-values is common
to mimesis and science ﬁction. On the contrary, Kaa is the best example
of that highly disciplined and ﬁnely balanced style which is realistic fantasy,
which requires detachment and lightness, that is to say the ability to ‘leggere
il mondo su molteplici livelli e in molteplici linguaggi simultaneamente’ (S,
p. ).
But what is the language in which today’s world is written? Calvino asked
 Pavel, Fictional Worlds, pp. –.
 Doležel, Heterocosmica, p. .
This content downloaded from 129.215.250.13 on Mon, 29 Apr 2013 12:06:48 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Qfwfq as Kaa?
this question in his lecture ‘e Written and the Unwritten World’, delivered
at New York University in , and argued that our ‘mondo quotidiano’ can-
not be described any longer with the mathematical precision of Galileo, but
rather appears as a palimpsest rewritten several times in diﬀerent languages
and alphabets. In this multi-layered written world, only realistic fantasy, and
not mimesis, can be the right ‘mode’ for literature: ‘La vera sﬁda per uno
scrittore è parlare dell’intricato groviglio della nostra situazione usando un
linguaggio che sembri tanto trasparente da creare un senso d’allucinazione,
come è riuscito a fare Kaa’ (S, p. ).
‘Amerika’: Kaa with Collodi
At this point, before we investigate further hypotheses, it may be worthwhile
to clarify again that I am not implying that Kaa is a Saussurian mot sous le
mot, or a ‘cipher’, like Chichita Singer for the name ‘Priscilla Langwood’ at the
end of the story ‘Mitosi’. Nor am I (simply) trying to add his name to the all
too long list of authors who contributed to the genesis of the Cosmicomiche.
I am rather maintaining that we can refer Qfwfq’s narrative mode to Kaa
as a semantic model for a uniﬁed interpretation of the cosmicomic project.
In other words, Kaa’s name is only a model relative to the interpretation of
Qfwfq’s possible worlds. With Sylvère Lotringer, I would say that the name
‘is only the ﬁctive framework of the germinative process, a “construction” by
means of which the heterogeneous can be read at the risk of being taken at
its word’.
A list of the main inﬂuences and inspirational sources of the Cosmicomiche
was provided by Calvino himself in a note to the ﬁrst edition, in which he
mentioned Leopardi, Popeye, Beckett, Bruno, Carroll, Matta, Landolﬁ, Kant,
Borges, and Grandville (RR, , ). Should we limit the research to this
rather desultory—and perhaps not entirely serious—list? It would be point-
less. Roberto Bertoni, for instance, put forward three other important authors
who shed light on the main character’s name:
Queneau, Fourier, Vittorini (le cui iniziali, sia concessa qui tra parentesi un’ipotesi so-
spesa scetticamente in un ambito congetturale fantastico, potrebbero anche incarnarsi
nelle lettere Q, f, v della prima metà del nome Qfwfq rispondendosi specularmente
nella seconda metà v, f, q …).
Queneau is the ideal point of departure (and arrival) for Calvino’s literary
experimentation, because ‘quella di Q. è pur sempre una lettura antropomorfa
 See Martin McLaughlin, Italo Calvino (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, ), p. .
 Sylvère Lotringer, ‘e Game of the Name’, Diacritics,  (), – (p. ).
 Roberto Bertoni, Int’abrigu int’ubagu: discorso su alcuni aspetti dell’opera di Italo Calvino,
(Turin: Tirrenia Stampatori, ), p. .
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o meglio antropotelica della storia naturale’, as he wrote in his little guide
to the Petite cosmogonie portative (). Charles Fourier is, without any
doubt, an important name in this universe ‘framed by desire as the key motive
force’, as suggested by Martin McLaughlin. And Elio Vittorini represents
an ideological turning-point in the literary debate about the ‘two cultures’,
which he would later call Le due tensioni. Bertoni gives details to better
appreciate the inﬂuence of these three authors, but the list remains necessarily
incomplete.
One of the relevant missing names, for instance, is Giorgio de Santillana.
In a  interview Calvino recalled that he ﬁrst met Santillana in Boston in
, and three years later again in Turin, attending his lecture on ‘Fato antico
e fato moderno’: ‘Fu allora che cominciai a scrivere le Cosmicomiche’ (RR, ,
). With the writer’s authentication, the origin of the cosmicomic stories
can be traced back to Santillana’s lecture in the same sense that Vittorini’s
initial may be inscribed, as a symbol of the ‘double bind’ of scientiﬁc and
literary imagination, at the centre of the name Qfwfq.
Beyond Santillana, the importance of Calvino’s American experience for the
composition of Le cosmicomiche is clear. As the thirty-seven-year-old Calvino,
recipient of a grant from the Ford Foundation, sailed into the harbour of New
York, a new chapter in his intellectual life began. ere was, initially, the sheer
enthusiasm for the powerful computers which were transporting and trans-
lating the old written world into the era of information technology, opening
up unparalleled possibilities for literary imagination. Above all, this meant
the discovery of a new modern epic, as later symbolized e.g. by Kaa’s Kü-
belreiter. Back from the States, Qfwfq will give literary evidence to Einstein’s
dream of riding a beam of light through the universe, ‘caracollando sulle
orbite planetarie e stellari come in sella ad un cavallo dagli zoccoli sprizzanti
scintille’ (RR, , ).
Although Kaa is not explicitly mentioned in Calvino’s American repor-
tages, we can certainly link Kaa’s Amerika () to the genesis of the
Cosmicomiche. Of course, the choice of this writer over other names—say
Queneau, ‘citato con frequenza’ during the s (S, pp. –), or a post-
modern author such as omas Pynchon—needs stronger evidence. An
 Italo Calvino, ‘Piccola guida alla Piccola cosmogonia’, in Raymond Queneau, Piccola cos-
mogonia portatile, trans. by Sergio Solmi, nd edn (Turin: Einaudi, ), pp. – (p. ).
 McLaughlin, Italo Calvino, p. .
 See Elio Vittorini, Le due tensioni: appunti per una ideologia della letteratura, ed. by Dante
Isella (Milano: Il Saggiatore, ), p. .
 Cf. Jonathan Usher, ‘Calvino and the Computer as Writer/Reader’, MLR,  (), –
(pp. –).
 See Paolo Zanotti, ‘ “Gli universi si fanno e si disfano ma è sempre lo stesso materiale che
gira”: appunti sulle eterotopie cosmicomiche di Calvino e un’ipotesi su Calvino e Pynchon’, Trame,
– (), –.
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obvious starting-point would be to assess the importance that Kaa had for
Calvino, from the very ﬁrst writings to the last, unwritten American lecture,
which included Amerika as a main reference.
In the well-known interview with Maria Corti in , Calvino mentioned
Kaa as one of the two main authors of his ‘biblioteca “genetica” ’, together
with Carlo Collodi:
Se una continuità può essere ravvisata nella mia prima formazione— diciamo tra i sei
e i ventitré anni — è quella che va da Pinocchio a America di Kaa, altro libro decisivo
della mia vita, che ho sempre considerato ‘il romanzo’ per eccellenza nella letteratura
mondiale del Novecento e forse non solo in quella. L’elemento uniﬁcante potrebbe
essere deﬁnito così: avventura e solitudine di un individuo sperduto nella vastità del
mondo, verso una iniziazione e autocostruzione interiore. (S, p. )
We could express the unifying element of Le cosmicomiche in the same terms,
and draw from this analogy an interpretative ‘isotopy’ between Qfwfq and
Kaa.e adjective ‘sperduto’ speciﬁcally refers to the working title of Kaa’s
American novel, Der Verschollene. In a (ﬁnally discarded) note for the third of
his American lectures, Calvino described the meaning of this novel as follows:
La storia dell’uomo nell’universo degli altri. Carl [sic] Rossmann non può seguire un
suo cammino senza che la presenza di qualcun altro non intervenga a deviarlo. [. . .]
Il titolo che K. voleva dare al racconto era Il disperso: è un processo di perdita di
identiﬁcazione (sociale) che il libro racconta (per un’identiﬁcazione con l’essenza vera
di sé?). (S, pp. –)
In the ﬁrst name of Amerika’s protagonist, here Italianized as ‘Carl’, we can
arguably infer a process of intellectual identiﬁcation between Calvino and
Kaa, mediated by the trans-world reference of the ﬁctional character to the
author of Pinocchio, Carlo Collodi. Alain Montandon has given some rea-
son to suppose that Kaa’s allusion to Collodi may be intentional. But the
combination of Collodi and Kaa strikes other resonant chords, revealing a
deep connection between the ﬁrst cosmicomic stories and Calvino’s own ﬁrst
novel, Il sentiero dei nidi di ragno ().
For a start, in the author’s note for the second edition of this novel, in ,
Calvino attached a portrait of himself as a young artist, ‘e qui lo vediamo
mentre gira per Praga e interroga il fantasma di Kaa’. So, if the protagonist
of Il sentiero carries the rather conspicuous name Pin, which is a clear allusion
to Collodi’s picaresque hero, the name of Kaa in the author’s note signals
the particular interpretation of realism that the young author was trying to
achieve.
 See Eco, Interpretation and Overinterpretation, p. .
 Alain Montandon, ‘Pinocchio en Amérique: Le Disparu de Franz Kaa à la lumière de
Collodi’, in Pinocchio: entre texte et image, ed. by Jean Perrot (Brussels: Presses Interuniversitaires
Européennes, ), pp. –.
 Album Calvino, p. .
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Almost two decades later, in the important  preface to the second
edition of Il sentiero, Calvino looked back and concluded that ‘il primo libro
sarebbe meglio non averlo mai scritto’ (RR, , ). At the same time, he
was writing the ﬁrst stories of Le cosmicomiche, later published with a repro-
duction of Escher’s Un autre monde on the cover—a woodcut print which,
coincidentally, dates back to the same year .
According to Carla Benedetti, the seminal story ‘Un segno nello spazio’
precisely represents the ambivalent relationship that the writer developed
with his ﬁrst novel, expressing his ‘embarrassment’ at its old-fashioned feel of
neorealism:
Come Qfwfq, anche lo scrittore Calvino sarà destinato a non poter ‘ritrovare’ il primo
segno. La parola direttamente intenzionale che contraddistingueva la prima opera è
ora vissuta con disagio, ora che un secondo occhio è pronto a giudicarla alla luce di
ciò che si sarebbe scritto dopo, e a decretarne l’‘ingenuità’.
As far as this reassessment bears evidence against naive realism, Kaa’s ‘fan-
tasma’ may also ﬁgure as a stylistic spectrum in the name Qfwfq, pinpointing
its literary function in the territory of realistic fantasy as Calvino, in keeping
with Collodi, understands it (S, pp. –). In this spectrum, the constant
Qfwfq describes the process of ‘dispersion’ of self-images through the possible
worlds of literature, in a vast textual universe before and beyond the existence
of human life.
If Castle: e Prison-House of a ‘Conte’
If the intensional naming system structures the ﬁctional world and contri-
butes to the sense of its literary macro-structures, the semantic interpretation
of Qfwfq as Kaa should become most apparent when the intensional re-
gularity of Le cosmicomiche is broken and systematically shied towards a
meta-literary discourse, as Doležel argued for the famous ﬁnal parable of
Kaa’s Prozess (). e same holds true for the Cosmicomiche vecchie e
nuove, and in particular for its very last story, which provides a clue for a new
interpretation of Qfwfq as Kaa, ‘Il conte di Montecristo’.
Calvino acknowledged the ‘kaismo del Montecristo’ in a  letter to
Luigi Baldacci: ‘mi ricollegavo intenzionalmente a Kaa proponendo una
assoluta spersonalizzazione come unica via d’uscita’ (L, p. ). e following
 See Mario Barenghi, ‘From Picasso to Dürer: Calvino’s Book Covers’, in Grundtvig and
others, pp. – (p. ).
 Carla Benedetti, ‘Calvino e i segni dell’autore’, in Piccole ﬁnzioni con importanza: valori della
narrativa italiana contemporanea, ed. by Nathalie Roelens and Inge Lanslots (Ravenna: Longo,
), pp. – (p. ).
 Doležel, ‘Proper Names’, p. .
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year, in a letter to Mario Boselli, the writer conﬁrmed and developed the same
point:
sì, il mio Montecristo vuole uscire dalla drammaticità esistenziale, spersonalizzare la
sua tensione, come condizione necessaria per uscire dalla prigione. E a ben vedere
anche K. — o meglio: lo stile di astratta precisione di Kaa— era un passo decisivo in
questa direzione; Kaa può essere letto nei due modi: come ‘storia di un’anima’ o/e
come descrizione d’una rete di rapporti oggettivi, e io credo che la seconda sia più
importante. (L, p. )
Kaa’s striving for an objective and impersonal style is well known. Following
his stylistic research, the name of the protagonist of his last novel, Das Schloss
(), was changed from the ﬁrst to the third person, as Max Brod reports
in his prefatory note, inserting K. ‘in the place of “I” ’. More than for the
obvious mirror function of the initial as regards the writer’s name, then, this
literary device is important because it singles out the intensional functioning
of the protagonist’s name from the normal system of ﬁctional names.
In ‘Il conte’ the quest for objectivity is also expressed through the fact that
the ‘real’ protagonist is the deuteragonist, the empirical Abbot Faria, who
performs the same function of Qfwfq as opposed to the speculative writer,
bearing on the same ﬁctional necessity:
Ogni mia ipotesi di fuga, cerco d’immaginarla con Faria come protagonista. Non che
io tenda a identiﬁcarmi con lui: Faria è un personaggio necessario perché io possa
rappresentare alla mia mente l’evasione in una luce obiettiva, come non riuscirei a fare
vivendola: dico, sognandola in prima persona. Ormai non so più se quello che sento
scavare come una talpa è il vero Faria che apre brecce nelle mura della vera fortezza
d’If o è l’ipotesi di un Faria alle prese d’una fortezza ipotetica. Il conto comunque
torna lo stesso: è la fortezza quella che vince. È come se, nelle partite tra Faria e la
fortezza, io spingessi tanto oltre la mia imparzialità da tenere per la fortezza contro
di lui... no, adesso esagero: la partita non si svolge soltanto nella mia mente, ma tra
due contendenti reali, indipendentemente da me; il mio sforzo è inteso a vederla con
distacco, in una rappresentazione senza angoscia. (RR, , –)
As in Kaa’s novel, we could say, the Castle always wins the literary game, but
the story is more important than victory: ‘Il conto comunque torna lo stesso’.
For that reason, once again, ‘facciamo conto che l’io soggetto della frase sia
Kaa’. Let us read this story as a counterfactual analysis of a conte fantas-
tique, which summarizes the non-mimetic relation of literature to reality and
maybe, as Todorov maintains, the relation of language to the world.
Calvino’s reference to Kaa is a signiﬁcant clue for interpretation. And yet,
of course, it cannot be a suﬃcient reason to read ‘Il conte’ as a cosmicomic
story. e main diﬀerence is that this story is not centred on the actual world
 Franz Kaa, e Penguin Complete Novels: ‘e Trial’, ‘e Castle’, ‘America’, trans. by Willa
Muir and Edwin Muir (Harmondsworth: Penguin, ), p. .
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as described by a scientiﬁc theory, but derives from an entirely ﬁctional world,
that of Alexandre Dumas’s Comte de Monte-Cristo (–). Relative to this
world, the author of the Comte is also a stipulated entity: ‘Chiamiamo Alex-
andre Dumas lo scrittore che deve consegnare al più presto al suo editore un
romanzo in dodici tomi intitolato Il conte di Montecristo’ (RR, , ). Ac-
cordingly, the main character of ‘Il conte’ is not Qfwfq, nor any similar string
of letters, but the pre-existing Edmond Dantès, future Count of Monte Cristo.
Lino Gabellone aptly deﬁned this last character as ‘un puro nome, o meglio
un tracciato nominale che collega tra loro diversi stati, diversi punti di una
serie’.Can we still recognize Qfwfq’s voice in this nominal trace? Or shall we
assume the stipulated author as the only unifying element of the cosmicomic
universe, from the initial collection of twelve stories up to the Cosmicomiche
vecchie e nuove? If so, without any doubt, Qfwfq disappears in a meta-ﬁctional
world in which the model reader can be interpreted as Kaa.
In the ﬁrst collection of cosmicomic stories the meta-ﬁctional model was
also represented through the last story, ‘La spirale’. Towards the end of ‘Il
conte’ we ﬁnd a clear reference to the structure of a spiral, which can be
interpreted in terms of possible-worlds semantics:
Una spirale può girare su se stessa verso il dentro o verso il fuori: se si avvita all’interno
di se stessa, la storia si chiude senza sviluppo possibile; se si svolge in spire che si
allargano potrebbe a ogni giro includere un segmento del Montecristo col segno più,
ﬁnendo per coincidere col romanzo che Dumas darà alle stampe, o magari per supe-
rarlo nella ricchezza delle occasioni fortunate. La diﬀerenza decisiva tra i due libri —
tale da farli deﬁnire l’uno vero e l’altro falso anche se identici — starà tutta nel metodo.
Per progettare un libro— o un’evasione— la prima cosa è sapere cosa escludere. (RR,
, –)
e diﬀerence between the two books depends on their position in the modal
calculus, and their respective truth-value can be assessed only in a system of
possible worlds, not in absolute terms. Calvino’s ‘Conte’ is possible relative
to the actual existence of Dumas’s Comte, which, in turn, can be constructed
only by way of systematic exclusions, i.e. through a narrative selection of its
possibilities according to a ‘principle of relevance’.
e spiral-reading of the cosmicomic universe allows us to draw a narra-
tive link from ‘Un segno’ to ‘Il conte’ at diﬀerent levels of the same central
textual world, viz. the same ‘fortezza concentrica’ (RR, , ). It is the ‘rag-
gera di possibili signiﬁcati’, as Calvino deﬁned it in the aforementioned letter
to Garroni, that connects the typographical ‘simmetria bilaterale’ of Qfwfq
to the thematic structure of a ‘simmetria raggiata’ (RR, , ). Elaborat-
 Lino Gabellone, ‘Aporie del raccontare’, Nuova Corrente,  (), – (p. ).
 Cf. Pavel, Fictional Worlds, p. .
 Cf. Ilene T. Olken, With Pleated Eye and Garnet Wings: Symmetries of Italo Calvino (Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, ), pp. –.
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ing on an interview given by the author in , Claudio Milanini further
explains:
La decisione di chiudere il libro con ‘La spirale’ derivava dalla volontà di alludere alle
plurime possibilità di sviluppo di una ricerca artistica che, pur traendo linfa da ten-
sioni e angosce provocate dal mondo reale, si sarebbe poi dilatata in una combinatoria
pressocché inesauribile d’invenzioni e d’immagini controfattuali. (RR, , )
In a counterfactual theory, the actual world is conceived and described as
it might have been (but is not). is is a more technical deﬁnition of the
possible-worlds model, as Kripke pointed out: ‘if one wishes to avoid the
Weltangst and philosophical confusions that many philosophers have associ-
ated with the “worlds” terminology, I recommended that “possible state (or
history) of the world”, or “counterfactual situation” might be better’.
Unlike science ﬁction scenarios, possible worlds are not versions of the
world as it might be in the future, but counterfactual statements which make
a point about the world as it is, considering that it might have been dif-
ferent. Accordingly, in Calvino’s ‘Conte’ the narrative development of the
title-protagonist is arrested in one of the central chapters of Dumas’s Comte,
and his ﬁctional task is to map out possible escapes from the If Castle. Aer
all, just as Dantès was imprisoned for a crime that he did not commit, the
writer is entangled in a novel that he has not yet completed. e author’s
meta-ﬁctional task consists in selecting narrative segments of the character’s
future from ‘tutte le varianti possibili d’uno smisurato iper-romanzo’ (RR,
, ), although he knows that, outside the prison-conte, future and past
eventually coincide.
Likewise, when Kaa writes that the Sirens are silent, he makes a counter-
factual statement on the Homeric world as it might have been. And even if
Kripke ‘could no longer write’ that Holmes would have existed in other states
of aﬀairs, yet he can maintain that ‘there might have been entities other than
those which exist’.Oddly enough, this is something that ﬁctional characters
share with the actual world, as explained by Simon Blackburn: ‘It is argu-
ably distinctive of laws of nature that they yield to counterfactuals (“if the
metal were to be heated, it would expand”), whereas accidentally true gener-
alizations may not’. Kaa’s realistic fantasy consists in this counterfactual
representation of human constructs—such as positive laws and habits—as
natural laws.
In this framework, Homer can be replaced with Kaa because the theoretic
model is simply meant to make a point about narrative structures. e use
 Kripke, Naming and Necessity, p. .
 ‘Semantical Considerations’, p. .
 Simon Blackburn, e Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
), p. .
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of ﬁctional names is only ‘il primo gradino della grammatica e della sintassi
narrativa’ (S, p. ), as Calvino argued in his conference on literature as
a ‘combinatorial game’, ‘Cibernetica e fantasmi’ (), which he notably
concluded with a quotation from the ending of ‘Il conte’:
Se riuscirò col pensiero a costruire una fortezza da cui è impossibile fuggire, questa
fortezza pensata o sarà uguale alla vera— e in questo caso è certo che di qui non
fuggiremo mai; ma almeno avremo raggiunto la tranquillità di chi sa che sta qui perché
non potrebbe trovarsi altrove— o sarà una fortezza dalla quale la fuga è ancora più
impossibile che di qui — e allora è segno che qui una possibilità di fuga esiste: basterà
individuare il punto in cui la fortezza pensata non coincide con quella vera per trovarla.
(RR, , ; cf. S, pp. –)
Since there is no impossible world in ﬁction, we shall assume that the im-
possibility of escaping from the If Castle depends on some restrictions of the
accessibility relations to its possible worlds: ‘Tra un’isola da cui non si può
uscire e un’isola da cui non si può entrare ci deve essere un rapporto’ (RR, ,
). e paradox is that the map of If and the map of Montecristo designate
the same island, that is to say ‘il luogo della molteplicità delle cose possi-
bili’ (ibid.). Using Ryan’s terminology, we can say that the main restriction
is in chronological and physical compatibility, which mark the diﬀerence
between science ﬁction and realistic fantasy.
When the distance between the real and the ﬁctional world is drastically
reduced, the model reader becomes a protagonist. is is what clearly hap-
pens in Se una notte d’inverno un viaggiatore (), where the aspiration to
an absolute third-person subject is emphatically expressed by Silas Flannery
in his diary: ‘Come scriverei bene se non ci fossi!’ (RR, , ). However,
distance can be reduced but not altogether removed, since it is a necessary
condition for ﬁction. According to Pavel, when this happens the principle
of relevance undergoes a radical transformation, from inferential practice to
more complex literary systems: this is the reason why we can read Kaa’s
Castle ‘as an undetermined parable of the human condition’.
e Labyrinth: Calvino and Leibniz
An interpretation of Le cosmicomiche in terms of possible-worlds ﬁction the-
ory does not need us to establish a direct relationship between Calvino and
Leibniz.is should be obvious. Before drawing to a conclusion, nevertheless,
a brief digression may be expedient to show that this relationship is also rather
problematic.
 See Ryan, Possible Worlds, pp. –.
 On this point see Benedetti, among others.
 Pavel, Fictional Worlds, p. .
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For a start, Calvino reads Leibniz within the Galilean project which deﬁnes
the paradigm of modern science, aimed at reducing the complexity of the
world to one universal language. But Galileo, like Dante, ‘cercava attraverso
la parola letteraria di costruire un’immagine dell’universo’ (S, p. ), while
Leibniz, like Dantès in his prison cell sans fenêtre, ‘resta solo a sostenere
la molteplicità dei mondi e a tendere l’orecchio a mille “voci matematiche”
diverse’ (S, p. ).
Furthermore, Leibniz is usually associated, as a derivative source, with the
work of Carlo Emilio Gadda. e combinatorial art of Leibniz enables Gadda
to draw a ‘mappa o catalogo o enciclopedia del possibile’, but Calvino sees
that it has a tragic outcome: ‘la complessità dei vorticosi processi di trasfor-
mazione s’espande in labirinti concentrici e non tarda ad aver ragione del più
ostinato ottimismo gnoseologico’ (S, p. ). Epistemic optimism is certainly
vital for any conception of literature which strives for ‘un’immagine cosmica’
(S, p. ), as Calvino stated in his important  essay ‘La sﬁda al labi-
rinto’. e diﬀerence is that for Calvino, unlike Gadda, the challenge is more
important than the labyrinth.
We should probably shi the theoretical focus from the Ars combinatoria
() of Leibniz to his Essais de théodicée (). In the preface to this later
work Leibniz distinguished ‘deux labyrinthes fameux’ where human reason
oen goes astray:
one concerns the great question of the Free and the Necessary, above all in the pro-
duction and the origin of Evil; the other consists in the discussion of continuity, and of
the indivisibles which appear to be the elements thereof, and where the consideration
of the inﬁnite must enter in. e ﬁrst perplexes almost all the human race, the other
exercises philosophers only.
Even if the object of the Essais is necessity, and not continuity, the philosopher
understands that the way out of the two labyrinths is the same, and entails
the application of modal logic to a ﬁctional continuum. e same intellectual
embarrassment arises, in fact, when we consider the presence of evil in the
actual world and the inﬁnite set of numbers: are they both ﬁctional entities?
By way of an answer, Leibniz concludes the treatise quoting in abstract a
dialogue by Lorenzo Valla and ‘keeping up the ﬁction it initiated’, but also
suggests one can ‘carry the little fable still further’. e continuation of the
petite fable is meant to show the reader that in order to understand the neces-
sity of things we have to consider their possibility, and not by the ‘knowledge
of vision’ but by ‘simple intelligence’. is ﬁnally amounts to acknowledging
 Gottfried W. Leibniz, eodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man and the
Origin of Evil, trans. by E. M. Huggard (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, ), p. .
 For the following quotations, see ibid., §§ –.
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that the project of the éodicée must fail, and the human mind should be
content with the Essais—i.e. with the challenge to the labyrinth.
Leibniz’s fable concerns a dream of the high priest eodorus, who is
transported to ‘the palace of the fates’ to be instructed on the case of Sextus
Tarquinius. Each room of the palace is a diﬀerent ‘possible world’ in which
eodorus ﬁnds diﬀerent representations of Sextus, all existentially incom-
plete and therefore varied in the consequences of his fate. In each possible
world there is a ‘book of its fates’, a hypertext which tells the history of that
world, and a similar individual named Sextus, identiﬁed by a number on
the forehead which also designates his place in the world-book: name and
number, ﬁction and calculus correspond to each other. In the case of the
name ‘Sextus’, the correspondence is obvious. But the name ‘eodorus’ also
involves hypertextual similarity, since the Essais were published anonymously
and some of the ﬁrst readers assumed the neologism ‘éodicée’ as a pseudo-
nym for the author. In both instances, similarity cannot motivate a name, but
only its trans-world identiﬁcation from the actual to the ﬁctional world.
e éodicée must end up in ﬁction, as required by its logical structure.
However, it can be further argued that the ﬁctional continuum of inﬁn-
ite name-numbers, in Leibniz’s own terms, cannot be read. Peter Fenves
clearly made this point while suggesting another continuation of Leibniz’s
tale, Kaa’s short story In der Straolonie ():
For Kaa’s ﬁction repeats the very same lesson as Leibniz’—with almost the very
same characters and with parodic allusions to the juridical context in which Leibniz
resumes the ﬁction invented by the great Italian humanist [sc. Valla]. Yet Kaa’s story,
unlike Leibniz’ fable, does not fail to emphasize that all instruction fails—not only
the lesson concerning the justice of the original order but also the reading lesson
[. . .]. at Kaa’s ﬁction constitutes a continuation of Leibniz’ is, of course, itself a
ﬁction; but this ﬁction of continuation seeks to show the point at which the ﬁctional
continuum does not so much come to an end as suﬀer a nonﬁctive—and therefore
eﬀective—interruption.
According to Leibniz’s modal system, the actual world is a privileged member
of the inﬁnite set of all possible worlds because it is the only one which can
justify existence in the name of reason, namely ‘membership in the sole order
of compossible individuals God could have brought into existence without
making himself guilty of injustice in the court of reason. Every mark on the
forehead can thus be read aer all—as a sign of this guilt’. is is what
happens in Kaa’s penal colony, where the ‘sentence’ is inscribed into the
prisoner’s body by an ingenious writing machine.
Fenves remarks that the operating instructions of Kaa’s machine appear
 Peter Fenves, ‘Continuing the Fiction: From Leibniz’ “petite fable” to Kaa’s “In der
Straolonie” ’, MLN ,  (), – (p. ).
 Ibid., p. .
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as a ‘labyrinthartige’ script, which can only be understood halfway into the
sentence, from the sixth hour onwards—that is, when Sextus corresponds
to his ‘just’ name-number in Leibniz’s fable. Incidentally, this may also be
the name-number of the famous ‘half-dozen of monkeys provided with type-
writers’, as suggested by Borges in ‘e Total Library’ (), which ‘would,
in a few eternities, produce all the books in the British Museum’.
It is worth noting that there are many similarities between Leibniz’s petite
fable and Calvino’s conte of Monte Cristo, imprisoned in the inﬁnite possible
worlds of a book that still needs to be completed. In the end, the labyrinth
of the theoretical script becomes meaningful by stipulating its continuity
with the labyrinth of the ﬁctional frame. Kaa’s (ﬁctional) continuation of
Leibniz’s ﬁction brings about a new scene of reading which is, ﬁnally, ‘unam-
biguously legible’.And the same is true for Calvino’s resumption of Dumas’s
conte, which becomes a meta-ﬁctional parable of the whole cosmicomic cycle.
Parables: How Much Shall We Bet?
In a  paper Maria Luisa Di Felice deﬁned Le cosmicomiche as ‘parabole
epistemologiche’. e deﬁnition is insightful, but should be understood in
a wider sense, as argued by Eugenio Bolongaro, ‘playfully allowing interfer-
ences from the French parabole, and the Italian parabola, which mean both
“parable” and “parabola”—a path through space, a horizon that also tells a
story and has a moral’.
In the ﬁrst place, we can say that Qfwfq is the axis of reﬂexive symmetry of
the cosmicomic parabola, whose focus is the vanishing-point of the Self. Its
semiotic function, corresponding to the logical function of a rigid designator,
is what the Oulipo group called a ‘contraînte’, a rigid point of view which de-
termines compositional possibilities, as deﬁned by Eco: ‘in the ﬁrst part of the
curve, as the rule becomes more stringent this stimulates creativity, whereas
beyond a certain point it blocks it deﬁnitively’. In Calvino’s literary pro-
duction this extreme point was reached with Le città invisibili (), a year
 See Franz Kaa, e Penguin Complete Short Stories, ed. by Nahum N. Glatzer (London:
Lane, ), p. .
 Jorge L. Borges, e Total Library: Non-Fiction –, trans. by Eliot Weinberger
(London: Lane, ), p. .
 Fenves, p. .
 Maria Luisa Di Felice, ‘Le cosmicomiche di Italo Calvino come “parabole epistemologiche” ’,
Problemi,  (), –.
 Eugenio Bolongaro, Italo Calvino and the Compass of Literature (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, ), p. .
 Quoted in Stefano Bartezzaghi, ‘Calvino at Play: Rules and Games for Writing in Space’, in
Grundtvig and others, pp. – (p. ). Cf. Anna Botta, ‘Calvino and the Oulipo: An Italian
Ghost in the Combinatory Machine?’, MLN ,  (), –.
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before the writer oﬃcially joined the Oulipo, and was a direct consequence of
the new literary research of Le cosmicomiche.
Bolognaro further considers that the cosmicomic parabola involves a hu-
manistic reﬂection ‘on the nature and possibilities of parable’, that is to say:
‘What happens when fables are no longer true, or no longer know how to tell
the truth? What happens when storytelling ceases to provide us with a human
compass for the world?’
For Calvino, constrained writing is not a game for its own sake, but must
have a poetic eﬀect and meet the historical conditions of meaning in terms of
possible human experience, as stated in ‘Cibernetica e fantasmi’: it is ‘gioco
che a un certo punto si trova investito d’un signiﬁcato inatteso’ (S, p. ).
Precisely, Calvino’s parabola is a semantic bet on a new humanistic parable:
‘da ciò la mia scommessa di rappresentare antropomorﬁcamente un universo
in cui l’uomo non è mai esistito, anzi dove sembra estremamente improbabile
che l’uomo possa mai esistere’ (S, p. ). We could say that the ‘operazione
Qfwfq’ (cf. L, p. ) is a parabola of parables in the age of cybernetics.
In this sense, in the story ‘Quanto scommettiamo’ Qfwfq bets on the exis-
tence of the universe from the very beginning, when the logic of cybernetic
feedback could no longer be applied. e paradox of the story is that the
human point of view introduces in the actual universe a fundamental element
of contingency, which can hardly be mastered. As a result, a complete de-
scription of the human world becomes impossible, or at least as possible as
using a newspaper as graph paper to plot the parabola of alternative possible
worlds. is is the world of (k)yK, who ﬁnally prevails on Qfwfq:
E sbandiera le pagine dei quotidiani, bianche e nere come lo spazio quando s’andavano
formando le galassie, e gremite — come allora lo spazio— di corpuscoli isolati, cir-
condati di vuoto, privi in sé di destinazione e di senso. E io penso a com’era bello
allora, attraverso quel vuoto, tracciare rette e parabole, individuare il punto esatto,
l’intersezione tra spazio e tempo in cui sarebbe scoccato l’avvenimento, incontestabile
nello spicco del suo bagliore, mentre adesso gli avvenimenti vengono giù ininterrotti,
come una colata di cemento, uno in colonna sull’altro, uno incastrato nell’altro, separati
da titoli neri e incongrui, leggibili per più versi ma intrinsecamente illeggibili, una
pasta d’avvenimenti senza forma né direzione, che circonda sommerge schiaccia ogni
ragionamento. (RR, , –)
e essentially illegible universe of contingent existents and events reminds
us of Balzac’s Chef-d’œuvre inconnu (), which, according to Calvino,
represents not only ‘una parabola sullo sviluppo dell’arte moderna’ but also
‘una parabola sulla letteratura’ (S, p. ). Balzac called this story a ‘conte fan-
tastique’, but eventually included it in his collection of Études philosophiques.
is change signals the writer’s shi from traditional fantasy literature to
 Bolongaro, p. .
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a new kind of realism, which Calvino describes as ‘potential’ literature, as
follows:
La fantasia dell’artista è un mondo di potenzialità che nessuna opera riuscirà a mettere
in atto; quello di cui facciamo esperienza vivendo è un altro mondo, che risponde
ad altre forme d’ordine e di disordine; gli strati di parole che s’accumulano sulle
pagine come gli strati di colore sulla tela sono un altro mondo ancora, anch’esso
inﬁnito, ma più governabile, meno refrattario a una forma. Il rapporto tra i tre mondi
è quell’indeﬁnibile di cui parlava Balzac: o meglio, noi lo diremmo indecidibile, come il
paradosso di un insieme inﬁnito che contiene altri insiemi inﬁniti. (S, pp. –)
e source of Calvino’s knowledge of the set-paradox about undecidable sys-
tems is the book Gödel, Escher, Bach (), by Douglas Hofstadter. e
paradox originates from the problem of self-referential sets, which Hofstadter
later developed to explain the ‘paradoxical level-crossing feedback loop’ which
constitutes the Self. But the very same idea can be expressed with another
word by Kaa, from his note ‘Von den Gleichnissen’ (): das Unfassbare,
the ‘incomprehensible’ of the parables. Kaa writes:
Many complain that the words of the wise are always merely parables and of no use in
daily life, which is the only life we have. When the sage says: ‘Go over’, he does not
mean that we should cross to some actual place, which we could do anyhow if the labor
were worth it; he means some fabulous yonder, something unknown to us, something
too that he cannot designate more precisely, and therefore cannot help us here in the
very least. All these parables really set out to say merely that the incomprehensible is
incomprehensible, and we know that already. But the cares we have to struggle with
every day: that is a diﬀerent matter.
It is arresting to think that Kaa draed this little parable when Wittgenstein
formulated the famous last proposition of the Tractatus (), translated by
Charles K. Ogden as follows: ‘Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be
silent.’
More to the point of my paper, in the central section of the Tractatus Witt-
genstein deﬁned the structure of language as the ‘logical picture’ (‘logisches
Bild’) of a possible state of aﬀairs, and explained that a name is meaningful
only within this structure, as an argument of its logical image function. He
then extended this to solve the paradox of self-referential sets. Accordingly,
if we consider Kaa as a recursive argument of Qfwfq’s stylistic function, we
should ask what its logical image is, and the question about its meaning can
be phrased as follows: does a parabola of parables still function as a parable?
 Douglas R. Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (New York: Basic Books,
). e best example of this paradox is probably Groucho Marx’s resignation joke: ‘I don’t
want to belong to any club that will accept me as a member.’
 Douglas R. Hofstadter, I Am a Strange Loop (New York: Basic Books, ), p. .
 Kaa, Short Stories, p. .
 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. by Charles K. Ogden (New York:
Barnes and Noble, ), p. .
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In a letter to Franco Rella, reviewing the manuscript of his book Metamor-
fosi: immagini del pensiero (), Calvino singled out the idea of Gleichnis—
howevermisleadingly translated as ‘ﬁgura’, instead of parable—and connected
its semantic value to the ‘visivitàmitica’ which appears ‘nel modo più convin-
cente nei riferimenti a Kaa’ (L, p. ). According to Rella, this is the case
because Kaa ‘non ha più ipotizzato ﬁlosoﬁcamente un mondo organizzato
secondo una ﬁnalità’, as Friedrich Nietzsche or Robert Musil did, ‘ma lo ha
raccontato, risolvendo l’ibridazione dei linguaggi in un nuovo “racconto”, in
un mito come capacità di comporre in una traiettoria, o in una peripezia, una
pluralità di sensi e di cose’.
I would like to conclude with this possible interpretation of Kaa’s Gleich-
nis, and suggest that the cosmicomic parabola is, in fact, a parable on the
actual hybridization of our written world. Once Kaa discovered the hybrid
reality of visible and invisibile worlds, which is one of the most powerful myth
structures of modern literature, as explained by Doležel, he ‘used its semantic
potential to generate many and diverse stories’. Likewise, Calvino used it
to bet on the existence and the ﬁgurative truth of the cosmicomic universe:
‘La scommessa di Italo Calvino è stata quella di far scaturire da questo uni-
verso invisibile e quasi impensabile delle storie capaci di evocare suggestioni
elementari come i miti cosmogonici dei popoli dell’antichità’ (RR, , ).
Each in his own way, both writers ask the reader to ‘go over’ and ‘vivere
magari il quotidiano nei termini più lontani dalla nostra esperienza’ (RR, ,
). And despite the fact that any bet on parables can be won in reality
but lost in parable, as stated in Kaa’s unfathomable conclusion, possible-
worlds interpretations show (if they do not prove) that Calvino won his bet in
all the worlds of Qfwfq.
U  E D M
 Franco Rella, Metamorfosi: immagini del pensiero (Milan: Feltrinelli, ), p. ; cf. ibid.,
p. .
 Doležel, Heterocosmica, p. .
 Kaa, Short Stories, p. .
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